Objectives. This report describes the history, true goals, and effects of tobacco industry-sponsored youth smoking prevention programs.
METHODS
We searched the following tobacco industry document archives made available by tobacco litigation during the 1990s: the University of California-San Francisco's Mangini collection of RJR and British American Tobacco marketing documents (http://www. library.ucsf.edu/tobacco), tobacco industry document Web sites (Philip Morris: http:// www.pmdocs.com; Brown and Williamson: http://www.brownandwilliamson.com; RJR: www.rjrtdocs.com; Lorillard: http://www. lorillarddocs.com; Tobacco Institute: www. tobaccoinstitute.com), Tobacco Documents Online (http://www.tobaccodocuments.org), and the Minnesota Select Set (outside.cdc.gov: 8080/BASIS/ncctld/web/mnimages). Search terms included the following: "youth," "youth smoking prevention," "YSP," "prevention," "access," "youth programs," "evaluation," "tracking," and the names of individual youth programs, such as Action Against Access and Helping Youth Decide. We extended the searches by using the names of key organizations and individuals identified in relevant documents, their office locations, project dates, and reference (Bates) numbers. Searches were conducted between June and December 2001. Initial searches yielded thousands of documents; these were read, and those relevant to tobacco industrysponsored youth smoking prevention efforts were selected, yielding a collection of 496 documents, which were analyzed in detail. We sought to be exhaustive in our searching to ensure that, to the best of our ability, the documents discussed in this report fairly and accurately represent the material we located.
RESULTS

Origins and Goals of the Tobacco Industry's Programs
The tobacco industry implements 4 types of youth smoking prevention programs ( Table 1 ): programs that speak directly to youths, programs that speak to parents, programs directed toward retailers, and programs that fund mainstream youth organizations. These programs stress several common themes: (1) smoking is an "adult choice," (2) children start smoking because of peer pressure and a lack of proper role modeling and guidance from their parents, and (3) an emphasis of "the law" as the reason not to smoke. Each type of program offers unique benefits for the industry. None discusses the fact that nicotine is addictive, that smoking or passive smoking causes disease, or that tobacco marketing has a role in promoting The tobacco industry is aggressively promoting its "youth smoking education and prevention" programs worldwide, modeled on ones it introduced in the United States in the 1980s, [1] [2] [3] nominally to reduce youth smoking. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] R. J. Reynolds Tobacco (RJR) reported that by 1999 it had distributed materials to millions of young Americans through amusement parks, video arcades, theaters, schools, Boys and Girls Clubs, and baseball camps. 9 In 2001, Philip Morris announced that it was "actively involved in more than 130 [youth smoking prevention] programs in more than 70 countries." 8 The few studies that have compared industry programs with public health campaigns found that industry programs were less appealing and convincing to youths [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] and that industry programs neglected the health effects of tobacco use and subtly promoted smoking. 15 Public health advocates have questioned the appropriateness of industry-sponsored youth smoking prevention programs. [16] [17] [18] [19] Previously-secret tobacco industry documents provide an important source of information on industry activities. 20 Academic studies of industry documents and youths have focused on proving that the tobacco industry targeted youths in its advertising. [21] [22] [23] [24] We analyzed tobacco industry documents to determine why the industry developed youth programs, to describe the themes that were pursued and how these programs were used, and to find evidence of whether these programs reduce youth smoking. The purpose of the industry's youth smoking prevention programs is not to reduce youth smoking but rather to serve the industry's political needs by preventing effective tobacco control legislation, marginalizing public health advocates, preserving the industry's access to youths, creating allies within policymaking and regulatory bodies, defusing opposition from parents and educators, bolstering industry credibil-access in stores. youth smoking. Used to fight strict access legislation in Iowa. Likewise, in 1991 Philip Morris restated that the success of the "youth initiatives" would be determined by whether they led to a "reduction in legislation introduced and passed restricting or banning our sales and marketing activities" as well as "passage of legislation favorable to the industry" and "greater support from business, parent and teacher groups." 33 The youth strategy repeatedly played a key role in the industry's efforts to undermine state tobacco control initiatives. These themes send mixed messages when used in "smoking prevention." 15, 46 Philip Morris ran literal "forbidden fruit" messages in a 1999 series of full-page advertisements in news magazines aimed at parents that featured a bowl of fruit (or a glass of milk with cookies) and the questions, "What else are you leaving out for your kids?" and "What else is within your kids' reach?" [47] [48] [49] One of the motivations behind the Tobacco Institute's youth programs was to displace educational programs developed by public health groups because these "almost all consist of wrongful 'scare' tactics" and "present smoking as repugnant and unhealthy." 40,50 A 1991 Tobacco Institute "Discussion Paper" shows how youth programs helped place responsibility for youth smoking on parents' inability to control peer pressure, a strategy that allowed the industry to shift the focus away from its advertising practices while portraying tobacco control advocates as "extremist":
Direct Funding of Youth Organizations
The youth program and its individual parts support The Institute's objective of discouraging unfair and counterproductive federal, state and local restrictions on cigarette advertising, by:
• Providing ongoing and persuasive evidence that the industry is actively discouraging youth smoking and independent verification that the industry's efforts are valid.
• Reinforcing the belief that peer pressure-not advertising-is the cause of youth smoking.
• Seizing the political center and forcing the anti-smokers to an extreme.
The strategy is fairly simple:
1. Heavily promote industry opposition to youth smoking. 2. Align the industry with broader, more sophisticated view of the problem, i.e., parental inability to offset peer pressure. 3. Work with and through credible child welfare professionals and educators to tackle the "problem." 4. Bait anti-tobacco forces to criticize industry efforts. Focus media on anti's extremism. Anticipate and blunt antis strongest points . . . for positioning purposes. Broad-based advertising . . . has the important effect of making the public aware that the industry says it is trying to do the right thing." 51 [italics in original] Whereas the industry was aggressive in saying that it was doing the "right thing," we were not able to locate any "persuasive evidence" verifying that the industry's youth smoking prevention programs actually reduced youth smoking.
Tobacco Industry Retailer Programs Help Fight Tobacco Control
In 1990, the Tobacco Institute launched the "It's the Law" program, which urged retailers to post signs and stickers and to wear lapel buttons stating that they did not sell tobacco to persons under 18 In addition, the industry has used its youth access programs to recruit a network of retailers as an "early warning system" to detect and defeat local tobacco control ordinances. [56] [57] [58] The tobacco industry funded its retail allies to perform these actions, and the retailer training program "It's the Law" helped facilitate the contact. A confidential 1992 report by Kurt Malmgren, senior vice president of state activities at the Tobacco Institute, to Chilcote makes this clear:
For monitoring purposes, we fund our allies in the convenience store groups to regularly report on ordinance introductions and assist in campaigns to stop unreasonable measures. Promotion of the Institute's "It's the Law" program and other industry programs play a helpful role as well.
57
A 1994 speech by Ellen Merlo, senior vice president of corporate affairs at Philip Morris, reveals that Philip Morris also enlisted the assistance of retailers to help defeat local ordinance efforts:
. . . with . . . local activity rampant, we realized we had to have some way to control the bleeding. We needed an effective system to let us know when and where local laws were being proposed, either at town meetings, in the local city councils or by Boards of Health. Working with the New England Convenience Store Association and other tobacco companies, we developed a network whereby local retailers could assist us by providing information on legislative activities in every Massachusetts Community. We've discovered that if we have enough advance notice . . . and get somebody there for the public hearing, we can make a difference. 56 The industry used this network to detect and fight not only youth access measures and advertising restrictions but also clean-indoorair laws. [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] In 1994, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced its intent to pursue regulations to protect children from tobacco promotion and nicotine addiction. The regulations would have ended tobacco advertisements within 1000 feet of schools, eliminated self-service tobacco displays, and required "tombstone" advertising for tobacco products (advertisements that consist only of black print on a white background, without pictures).
64 Philip Morris used its Action Against
Access youth program as part of its argument that the FDA's proposal was unnecessary. 65 A 1996 RJR press release argued that the FDA regulation was unnecessary because the industry's We Card program was "now making a measurable difference." 66 The release gave no details about the relative size of this claimed "difference" or how it was measured, nor any verification that it was measured at all.
Working Through Third Parties: The National Association of State Boards of Education
The tobacco companies recognize that they lack credibility with the public and policymakers. 67, 68 This situation makes representation by credible third parties an indispensable tool for the tobacco industry to achieve its goals, particularly in dealing with politicians. 69 • NASBE will provide us with an established, clear link to all levels of government: federal, state and local.
• NASBE's members tend not to be educators, but members of the business-political community elected or appointed to serve on their respective State Boards of Education. They are not "cause" oriented and are, for the most part, politically savvy and supportive of business perspectives. There is no evidence of antitobacco bias at NASBE. . . . potential critics within the educational establishment will be cautious about raising objections to this program. . . . At the direction of the Executive Committee, exploratory discussions have been held with NASBE. 70 The Tobacco Institute hired NASBE's past president, Jolly Ann Davidson, to tour the country with Walker Merryman, the institute's vice president for communication, to promote the program to the media and legislators. [71] [72] [73] The first places the institute planned to send Davidson and Walker were states considering legislation that would limit or ban promotions that offered free samples of cigarettes. 74, 75 Shortly after joining with the Tobacco Institute, NASBE found itself criticized by health advocates. 76 Soon, the institute started holding money over NASBE's head to try to force the organization to cooperate with its public relations goals. In a May 30, 1986, memorandum, Duffin stated her intent to remind a NASBE official that:
(1) we have not got our money's worth in planned projects in any year so far (2) we certainly have not had the full time attention of the three staffers whose time we reportedly have been paying and (3) we will set up our 1986 payment based on completed projects delivered, not drafts, as has been our downfall. 90 A handwritten February 2, 1987, memorandum by a NASBE employee reflects growing ill will between the 2 organizations, particularly Duffin's references to people "at T.I. who question whether they are getting their money's worth from our past and current efforts."
91
In 1988, NASBE terminated its relationship with the institute by withdrawing its sponsorship of the youth programs. 92, 93 The Tobacco Institute then created its own "independent foundation" to replace NASBE. This foundation, the Family COURSE Consortium, was presented as a "not-for-profit organization comprised of educators, youth organization professionals and other interested parties." 94 The "single goal" of the Family COURSE Consortium was to promote youth programs in a manner responsive to the institute. 92 smoking. Instead, tobacco companies studied the reach and effectiveness of these programs as though they were public relations campaigns, tracking the number of "media hits," awareness of the program among adults, and the effect of the program on their corporate image.
108-112
A 1986 evaluation report written by NASBE for the Tobacco Institute's Helping Youth Decide program concentrates on describing the audience, the reasons people request the educational booklet, the circumstances in which the booklet has been used, and users' feedback on the attractiveness, helpfulness, or usefulness of booklet elements.
113,114 The section of the evaluation dealing with the efficacy of the program fails to define any criteria for "success." 114 A 1994
RJR report on youth campaigns states that a retailer program in the United Kingdom was "very successful," simply because 80% of retailers there were using point-of-sale materials provided by the National [tobacco] Manufacturers Association. No mention was made of success related to an actual reduction in youth smoking rates.
115
Although the industry conducted surveys and focus groups while developing its youth smoking prevention programs to select appealing advertisements with clear messages, we did not find any research evaluating the advertising's effect on teen smoking. Most of the formative research focuses on demonstrating teens' ability to identify the main message of the advertisements. Philip Morris's advertising agency, Young & Rubicam, conducted surveys testing youth smoking prevention billboard advertisements with groups of teenagers in New York in 1992. 116 Young &
Rubicam also tested television advertisements with children aged 10 to 14 and their parents in 1998. 117 In both cases, the firm monitored teens' ability to identify the main message of the advertisement and various other responses to the advertising, such as liking, attention, ability to relate, interest, ability to understand, and uniqueness. 116 The main result reported to television stations in 1998 was that nearly all of the children studied could identify the main message of the advertisements to be "Don't smoke/Not to Smoke." Levy, had formerly conducted marketing research, 118 including research on teens. 119, 120 As part of its research on reactions to its television advertising campaign, Philip Morris did ask parents how much the commercial would convince their child not to smoke. In responding to a television network's questions about evidence for the effectiveness of the advertisements, Levy combined 3 divergent response categories ("very much," "somewhat," and "very little"), thus counting any response but the most negative as a positive assessment of the effectiveness of the commercials. 117 Philip Morris complained when the media pointed out the apparent lack of measures of the effectiveness of the company's advertising campaign in actually preventing teen smoking. 121 In an interview with ABC television news in 1999, Levy admitted that Philip Morris did not ask its study group children whether the advertisements would have any influence on their decision of whether to smoke. 122 Continuing this pattern, Philip Morris ran a series of youth antismoking advertisements during the 2000 Super Bowl football games called "My Reasons." The sole basis of Philip Morris's claim of the advertisements' effectiveness apparently was an informal survey asking 400 youths and their parents whether they understood the basic message in the advertisement. Aside from reporting that 97% of parents and 98% of children understood that the message in the advertisements was against smoking, Philip Morris did not indicate whether the advertisements had any effect on the children's intent to smoke. 123 Philip Morris has sophisticated methods of testing cigarette advertisements and assessing relevance, imagery, and intent to purchase the advertised brand, 124, 125 but the company did not appear to use these to assess how its youth smoking prevention advertisements would affect purchasing behavior.
In contrast, the industry assessed in great detail the public relations and legislative outcomes associated with its youth smoking prevention programs. In 1986, the Tobacco Institute asked its lobbyists to rate the Helping Youth Decide programs' value to the company as a legislative tool. 108 In 1995, Philip
Morris added a module to its consumer tracking surveys, which tracked approximately 700 smokers per week, to monitor the effect of its Action Against Access program.
109,111
The module asked smokers whether they were aware that Philip Morris (as opposed to the government or politicians) started the Action Against Access program, whether they had noticed changes in signage and identification checking, and whether and how the program affected their feelings about Philip Morris. 110 Both the reported results of this survey tracking and the original questionnaires neglect any assessment of youth smoking or reduction in youth access to tobacco. Philip Morris's September 1995 National Visibility Study audited 3729 stores for visible signage for the company's "Ask First-It's the Law" program, and also measured the visibility of RJR's underage signage. There was no mention of measurement of actual youth access to cigarettes in the study. evaluation document does not say that an objective is to measurably reduce youth smoking rates. Like all of the other industry youth smoking programs, the outcomes are evaluated not in terms of influencing teen smoking but rather in terms of the effects on adult response and Lorillard Tobacco's corporate image.
"Youth Smoking Prevention" Legitimizes Tobacco Industry Research on Teens
The tobacco industry has been criticized for directing its marketing efforts at young children. [21] [22] [23] [24] [127] [128] [129] [130] [131] Indeed, evidence that it did so seriously undercut the industry's political and legal position during the 1990s. Practices such as the use of cartoon characters to advertise cigarettes brought the tobacco industry as a whole under closer scrutiny. [132] [133] [134] [135] [136] It became dangerous for the industry to even study teenagers, and thus the industry invented code words to avoid explicit mention of teens in its marketing research. 24 The industry's new "teen smoking prevention" programs beginning in the late 1990s have provided cover for the industry to begin aggressive studies of teenage attitudes toward smoking. Although these data nominally are collected as part of a "youth smoking prevention" effort, they contain precisely the same information tobacco marketers need to sell their products to young people. In fact, Philip Morris used the same advertising agency, Young & Rubicam, to develop both its "youth smoking prevention" advertisements 116, 137 and its cigarette advertisements. 138, 139 A comparison of the topics of a Philip Morris "youth smoking prevention" study and a "young adult smoker" cigarette marketing study reveals great similarity (Table 2) . 137, 140 Even if tobacco industry research on teens were legitimately used to deter rather than encourage smoking, the same research could also be used to design programs with little or no impact on smoking initiation. In 1992 and 1993, Young & Rubicam conducted research with teens in New York City schools to "understand the underlying dynamics of how youths aged 12-17 resist or succumb to social pressures, particularly as it [sic] relates to the decision not to smoke." 116, 137 Rather than focusing on older teens, who are at the highest risk for smoking initiation and who would be sensitive to messages aimed at young adults, Philip Morris found that it could tailor a smoking prevention advertisement specifically to younger teens. 116 These messages would leave older teens vulnerable to "young adult" cigarette advertising. 141 Indeed, Young & Rubicam's research indicated that New York City "teens think of themselves more as 'young adults' than kids." 137 In 1992, Young & Rubicam's research on New York teenagers revealed that younger and older teens reacted differently to advertisements and that teens were more responsive to advertisements depicting people their own age. Thus, one could tailor a message to younger teens (12-14 years old in this study) or to older teens (15-17 years old), depending on the age of the actor: "The quantitative study validates the appeal of this campaign. But it also points to the importance of casting younger for younger teens (currently the campaign shows older teens perhaps explaining why this execution is more attention-getting for the older teens)." 116 The plans appear to involve modifying the campaign to appeal to the younger teens only. By 1998, Philip Morris was targeting even younger children (aged 10-14 years) for its "youth smoking prevention" advertisements. Young & Rubicam also conducted the research for these advertisements, and the firm did not survey older teens as it had in the past. Instead, it tested the advertisements on children aged 10 to 14 years and their parents.
117 Philip
Morris's research on teenagers allowed it to develop advertisements that scored well with parents and appeared to target the youngest teens. By not making teenagers aged 15 to 18, who are at a substantially greater risk to start smoking, the intended audience for these messages, the company preserved the primary source of new smokers. Lorillard Tobacco Company has also enjoyed new legitimate access to teens through its youth smoking prevention programs. Lorillard has been able to place its "Tobacco Is Whacko" advertisements in youth markets to which they would otherwise be denied legal access, including the most popular teen television shows on Warner Brothers Prime Time, ESPN, and MTV; the "Miss Teen USA Pageant" and "Billboard Music Awards"; sports events such as ESPN's "Summer X-Games"; wrestling shows on USA, UPN, and TNT; and in DC and Marvel comic books, Seventeen magazine, and Teen People.
142,143 Many of these advertisements encourage teens to visit Lorillard's Web site, where they can fill out surveys and enter sweepstakes. Not only does this information allow Lorillard to develop a mailing list of teens, it also allows the company to collect psychographic data (information about activities, interests, and opinions that can be used to develop consumer psychological profiles) 144 through inquiries about popular clothing trends, dream vacations, hot music groups, television and movie stars teens admire, computer games, favorite sports events and athletes, superheroes, and what they feel the president's priorities should be. 145 The "Tobacco Is Whacko" program provides Lorillard with cover for continuing to contact and study teens.
Tobacco Industry Youth Smoking Prevention Programs Outside the United States
During the 1990s, the tobacco industry repeated its pattern of implementing youth programs to boost its image and deflect public health legislation worldwide (Table 3) , just as it has in the United States since the early 1980s. A 1993 memorandum, "Youth Campaigns for Latin America," by Cathy Lieber, Philip Morris's director of corporate affairs for the Latin American region, states that Philip Morris needs to implement youth programs to counteract negative publicity in Latin America:
Increasing pressure from anti-tobacco forces in Latin America has created the need to explore various options to counter negative publicity. One theme that has recently surfaced in several markets is that multinational companies target children in ad campaigns. . . . Taking into consideration the emerging adverse legislative climate in the region, we have an opportunity to create good will for the tobacco industry by going public with a campaign to discourage juvenile smoking. Our objective is to communicate that the tobacco industry is not interested in having young people smoke and to position the industry as a "concerned corporate citizen" in an effort to ward off further attacks by the anti-tobacco movement.
[italics added]
In non-English-speaking countries, the tobacco industry has used translations of its 
DISCUSSION
Tobacco industry "youth smoking prevention" programs began to emerge in the 1980s as a political response to increased public scrutiny of industry marketing tactics aimed at youths. After introducing these programs, the industry discovered and began exploiting their utility as effective public relations tools to deflect regulation. During the late 1990s, the industry rapidly expanded these programs worldwide, often with the assistance of educational authorities and governments. This expansion has occurred in the absence of any objective evidence from the tobacco industry or other sources that these programs actually reduce youth smoking and despite the fact that the few studies that do exist in the academic literature suggest that they do not prevent-and may even encourage-youth smoking. 13, 15 The tobacco industry's youth smoking prevention programs do not implement the strategies that have been demonstrated to influence youth smoking: aggressive media campaigns that denormalize tobacco use and stress the industry's dishonesty, 154, 155 tax (price) increases that reduce the affordability of cigarettes, 156, 157 and smoke-free workplaces 158, 159 and homes [160] [161] [162] that reduce the social acceptability of smoking and reinforce the nonsmoking norm.
163-169
The industry's programs consistently fail to address the health consequences of tobacco use and never mention that nicotine is addictive. 15 In particular, the "truth" youth smoking prevention campaign advertisements that stress industry deception were more memorable and convincing to more teens than the Philip Morris "Think. Don't Smoke." campaign. [10] [11] [12] "Think. Don't Smoke." advertisements have also been associated with an increase in the intention to smoke in the next year. 170 Even Philip Morris's own focus groups, created to gauge public opinion regarding its youth campaigns, reveal that tobacco industry-led campaigns are "universally rejected as not credible" and that people believe that these such campaigns are "contradictory to industry interests." 171 Although the industry has generally been successful in introducing its programs, there have been some exceptions. Despite substantial financial inducement and the support of the National 4-H Council, 27 state 4-H branch organizations refused to participate in Philip Morris's program. In 2000, when Philip Morris distributed book covers that said "Think. Don't Smoke." to schools in California without prior authorization, the effort was resoundingly rejected on the advice of the California Departments of Education and Justice. 172 The departments distributed a joint memorandum warning schools that Philip Morris was attempting to promote its corporate identity among children by distributing the book covers and asking that Philip Morris stop the campaign and recall the book covers (Rosaedit Villasenor, Pomona Public Schools; Personal communication; January 11, 2000) . This statewide rejection represented a significant improvement in the understanding of tobacco industry motives by the Department of Education, which 10 years earlier had been distributing Tobacco Institute programs. 38 Citizens and policymakers should reject any "educational" programs by the tobacco industry. If the tobacco industry were sincere in its stated desire to contribute to reducing youth smoking, it would stop opposing policies and programs that have been demonstrated to be effective. Policymakers who believe that the industry would do anything that would negatively affect recruitment of new smokers are ignoring history and fooling themselves. 
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